Abstract: Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is one of the system thinking approaches 11 emerged in the 1990s. Since then it has been applied in various countries and contexts. However, the 12 implementation of the IWRM is contested. There are paucity of literature and guidelines as to how the 13 concept can be operationalized. In Ethiopia, there is no evidence that IWRM is successfully instituted. 14 Particularly, IWRM has never been implemented in the Awash River Basin. The study generated data 15 from household and institutional surveys, in-depth interviews, focused group discussions, workshops, 16 and secondary sources. Multiple sources of data were triangulated and thematically summarized. We 17 found that pragmatic water resources management through system approach helps to recognize river 18 basin as a bigger system in which the natural and human systems function. This resolves the problem of 19 fragmentations among among various actors, sectors, interest and priorities. That it facilitates the 20 coordination of various subsystems. The operationalization of IWRM as a system to secure water 21 resources require the establishment and/or strengthening of the interactions of various systems, 22 subsystems, and the elements within the entire basin system. Finally, enabling institutional environments 23 should be considered as a medium of realizing IWRM. 24
Introduction 28
Water security is systemic and complex. Such systemic approach to water resources 29 management has been received little attention for long-time [1, 2] . It is non-linear that need to be 30 analyzed using systems thinking approach. In systems thinking, the whole is greater than the sum of 31 its parts because a system is dynamic and not simply determined by the actions of an enclave sector 32 IWRM as a panacea to curb water the resources management crises in those countries. As a result, 66 several countries have adopted IWRM in their policies and programs haphazardly without proper 67 institutional setting that affected water resources management in various developing countries by 68 confusing its concepts [16] . The concept of IWRM is so fuzzy that what to integrate, how, by whom, 69 or where remain vague [9] . 70
The successes of implementing IWRM are mixed and hence contentious [17] . It is like half-full 71 or half-empty. The practice of IWRM in developing countries to ensure water security has the major 72 setback [18, 19, 11] . Likewise, [20] reported that more than 80% of countries had tried to apply 73 IWRM in their policies and strategies yet the success of the efforts are under scrutiny. To cite a few, 74 IWRM has failed in Brazil where various barriers affected the integration of socio-economic aspects 75
[21]. In the USA, IWRM is not penetrated deeply into the culture of water resources managers [13] . 76
In Ghana, "there is a conflict between the IWRM goal of integrating all water uses and sectors in the 77 management of water resources and focusing on the prioritization of water delivery services" [23] 78 (p.33). In Ethiopia, the failure of IWRM attributed to the institutional failure and political 79 commitment despite the policy alleged the entire water resources process is based on IWRM [15, 23] . 80
Consistent with these experiences, [10](p.21) curiously noted "it is hard to the find any water policy, 81
program or project at any scale anywhere in the world that can be rated a score of 30 out of 100 on a 82 scale of 1 to 100 (1 being no integrated water resources management and 100 being full integration)." 83
The reasons are also context dependent but the core explanation was water resources officialdom 84 always discursively rhetoric and overuse IWRM as a 'term of the day' without realizing its entities 85 and tenets [9] . The water policy or bureaucratic systems widely use IWRM principles to justify water 86 resources management as a novel idea. As a result, it becomes a normative approach fashioned in the 87 formalization of water policy [24] . This shows the impediment in the operationalization of the 88 concept rather than the principle itself. The setback in IWRM is not only attributed to the cumbersome 89 of the concept, which is vastly a process-oriented but also how it could be practiced. It is in this 90 context that new challenges need a change an approach and institutional arrangements. The change 91 should translate the 'buzzy' principles to actions and the policy into realities. It must also reconcile 92 conflicting and competing concepts and practices. 93
Informed by an international sphere of influences, Ethiopia has formulated water resources 94 management policy geared towards IWRM through River Basin Organizations (RBOs) as early as 95 1999 [25] . It was the time when IWRM received greater attention, becoming catchy and buzzy. The 96 fundamental principles of IWRM in Ethiopia are aimed to guide equitable, sustainable and efficient 97 development, utilization, conservation, and protection of water resources in Ethiopia. The 1992 98
Dublin Principles and other international fora influenced the policy statement. The policy declared 99 IWRM as a general framework and River Basin Organizations (RBOs) as a unit of IWRM. Water sector 100 strategy, programs, and several laws and regulations followed the policy statements. However, as to 101 our present knowledge, the efforts have neither instituted IWRM at the basin level nor provided any 102 real guidance to the water professionals and practitioners as to how the concept can be 103 operationalized. Particularly, IWRM has never been implemented in the Awash River Basin [15] . 104
The implementation of IWRM is setback despite huge emphasis of IWRM as a remedy for water 105 insecurity in basin context. The move towards IWRM must come up with an option. The paper seeks 106 to answer the question how could IWRM be a roadmap to attain water security in the Awash River 107
Basin. In order to answer this question, we need to ask two more questions. What to integrate? How 108 to integrate? While the first question considers the sectors and actors must be brought together, the 109 second question addresses the mechanism to link and understand various sectors, actors, and uses. 110
The paper thus introduced systems thinking, as pragmatic IWRM, to integrate the interplay and 111 interaction of actors and sectors in the basin. It further argues that institutional processes could be 112 possible through system thinking. Despite, application of system thinking in various discipline, its 113 application in water resources management is very limited. This paper is far from a comprehensive 114 analysis of the entire variants of systems theory in water resources management. It rather introduces 115 systems idea to understand the problem of water resources and illustrate the complex issues of IWRM 116 in basin context. 117
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follow: section two describes the conceptual 118 framework that brings IWRM at the center of systems thinking approach. Section three describes the 119 methods and techniques used to gather and analyze data. Section four presents the myths and 120 existing implementation gaps in IWRM followed by section five, which outlines the system approach 121 in water resources management of Awash Basin. The sixth section explores enabling institutional 122 environments to put IWRM pragmatically. Finally, section seven draws key conclusions and policy 123 implications. 124
Conceptual Framework 125
the resulting socioeconomic well-being without compromising the long-term health of vitalecosystems'[14] (p.18). When objectively seen, it is full of contested terminologies. It is simply 139 'unusable' or 'un-implementable' in operational terms [10] . The definition also left the concept for 140 further interpretations remarking it as a 'process'. It does not indicate how integration is possible -141 the question that matters practically! However, the process-oriented nature of IWRM provides an 142 avenue for water sectors and stakeholders to interact and to create dialogues for joint action and 143 collaboration. Furthermore, IWRM embeds several sub-processes like a 'big tent' [13] . 144
The other undeniable fact is that the IWRM often donor-driven or via NGOs interventions 145 whereas the government stakeholders are approaching sectorial modalities. These external pushes 146 sometimes regularly meet as platforms to discuss on water issues. Information shared in these 147 platforms does not always translate into coordinated donor efforts [11] . Thus, understanding the 148 underlying causes of such narrow focus is the central concern of systems thinking from the lens of 149 IWRM. The recognition of IWRM as a system approach to water without appreciating the complexity 150 in terms of the concept, scale [26] , and institutional setting is a futile exercise. The integration of 151 sectors and power structures are becoming problematic. 152
To this end, the means to achieve water security must go beyond the conventional assumption 153 of 'unfinished' concepts of IWRM. Amma & Gupta [22] underlined that the holistic and sectorial 154 focused approaches in water service delivery seem to be irreconcilable. Such sectorial thinking must 155 shift to systems thinking through IWRM called pragmatic viewpoint. It exploits the strengths of the 156 IWRM principles because pragmatism is an attempt to coordinate and integrate realistically the social 157 system, human system, equity aspect, and political system [7] . A system approach is almost absent 158 from discussion of water resources management at the basin level. Within the context of the larger 159 system, the basin is the larger system while the aquifers and surface water are subsystems. This is 160 how the paper employed a holistic framework that can accommodate emerging issues of water 161 resources security (Figure 1) . 162
One cannot devoid the principles of IWRM because they are demanding in context where the 163 coordination is needed between resources -land and water, as well as among stakeholders on 164 equitable resources access. Ruther weakness could be bridged in the sense that IWRM can induce 165 dialogues to sustain the return from the basin. Scientific community believe that the IWRM is 166 emerged from system approaches that transposed integrated management into water resources 167 [16] .Thus, action-oriented arrangements to implement the principles and frameworks of IWRM are 168 needed. The working definition of IWRM can be provided from systems perspective. Integration 169 requires the inclusion and coordination of different systems at various levels-micro, meso, and 170 macro 4. 171 According to [27] , the integration involves natural and human systems. The natural system 175 encompasses availability and quality of water while the human system constitutes utilization of 176 water resources, waste production, and pollution of the resources. Thus, IWRM concomitantly 177 addresses the integration of natural and human systems, which in turn include the integration of 178 various sub-systems as represented in Figure 1 . In a pragmatic sense, IWRM negotiates among 179 various actors, sectors, and their interests. It coordinates resources -land and water, as well as among 180 stakeholders who share these resources. 181
Materials and Methods 182
The study generated data for this paper from household and institutional surveys, in-depth 183 interviews with key informants, focused group discussions (FGDs), direct observations and 184 workshop participants, and secondary sources. First, the paper drew on the perspectives of water 185 experts (n=15) as a benchmark to understand and assess the existing situations, the institutional 186 performance in the Awash Basin to create holistic and integrated resources management among 187 various entities. This helps to comprehend and shed light on the enabling institutional environments 188 in the basin. Second, a case study of Fentale district from Awash River basin was employed to 189 generate evidences on situations of various aspects of water resources management and its 190 implications on household water security at micro level. We selected the district because of severe 191 water crises triggered frequent drought and environmental resource degradation. As a result, it is 192 experiencing an increase in competition for water among various users. This has affected household 193 level resilience capacity and weakening of the local institutions and customary practices to cope with 194 shocks and deal with water management. The data was collected from 400 randomly selected 195
households. 196
Third, face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with 38 
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The data collection emphasized:-how water sectors are working with other sectors, the 215 interaction and relationship between upstream and downstream users, the existing water quantity as 216 well as water quality, various water uses such as irrigation, livestock, domestic, and other livelihood 217 could not put into practice the policy statements into practice hence the principles of IWRM. In the 235 policy document, the IWRM tenets have meritoriously ordered many of the recent trendy, 236 fashionable, and politically correct but operationally fuzzy parlances (see Table 1 ). 237 238
Table 2. Principles of Ethiopian Water Resources Management Policy relation to IWRM 240
Ethiopia has adopted IWRM in 1999 as a general framework for water resources management. The fundamental principles are aimed to guide equitable, sustainable and efficient development, utilization, conservation, and protection of water resources in Ethiopia. The principles include: 1) Water is a natural endowment commonly owned by all the peoples of Ethiopia.
2) As far as conditions permit, every Ethiopian citizen shall have access to sufficient water of acceptable quality, to satisfy basic human needs. 3) In order to significantly contribute to development, water shall be recognized as both an economic and a social good. 4) Water resources development shall be underpinned by rural-centered, decentralized management, participatory approach, as well as an integrated framework. 5) Management of water resources shall ensure social equity, economic efficiently, systems reliability and sustainability norms. 6) Promotion of the participation of all stakeholders, user communities; particularly women's participation in the relevant aspects of water resources management.
Yet, the policy has gained tremendous applauses from donor agencies as it was fashioned with 242 the parlances of IWRM. It was, thus, called 'comprehensive' and 'all inclusive' even without 243 fashioning 'water security'. The policy was successful in assaulting the eye and thought of the donors 244 and NGOs. Consequently, it secured incredible funding following philanthropic logic as [32] call it, 245
including from the World Bank and UN agencies. It seems that the concept included in the policy for 246 the sake of attracting funds, or to obtain greater national and international acceptance and visibility, 247
and enticed the eyes of the various donors. In reality, the statements in the policy are tremendously 248 a rhetoric and the implementation has been so far meager. increased water supply coverage from merely 17% in 1990s-the lowest of Sub-Saharan African-to 257 65% in 2015, the destination to reach water security is remaining slothful due to a temporal and spatial 258 variability of rainfall and institutional barriers. Improving WaSH access coverage is not an end for 259 water security because the state of water access, availability, and safety is so fragile that sustainability 260 issues always surfaced. MoWIE have the vision to achieve IWRM, Regional Water Resource Bureaus (Afar, Oromia) have 291 suspicious on its practicality. The latter believe that they have no problem to work in integration but 292 the RBOs compromise the powers and duties enshrined in the regional state to plan and execute 293 water resources. Interviews with regional and district levels stakeholders eloquently illustrated that 294 the motive to put water resources management under RBOs, without the consensus of the pertinent 295 stakeholders is to gain control over water resources. Under such power dynamics, the regions and 296 districts are confined to implement small-scale infrastructures such as irrigation and artisan while 297 Federal agencies gain control over larger projects. They justified that the current institutional 298 arrangement is not fair as regions have also a motive to use water for socioeconomic development of 299 the local people. 300
The donors and NGOs are promoting and funding the implementation of IWRM principles as a 301 useful and promising tool to achieve water security in nutshell. The Civil Society Organizations 302 (CSOs) and other external stakeholders also promote IWRM. They believe that the implementation 303 of IWRM should be through a bottom-up and decentralized approaches. Until now, the push to 304 stakeholders. In addition, IWRM is affected by uncoordinated interventions as illustrated by an 306 expert at District Water Office in Amibera. He reported that 307 water sector is very delicate here because of water scarcity. Yet, water planning, management, and 308 decision-making processes are increasingly messy. The training we received on integrated principles 309 yet giving a sermon of policy statements are merely valid here. Various stakeholders 'hit and run' and 310 end-up with false promises. Sometimes, we meet once a year; we talk about principles and go. They 311 scared to go to action-integration. Thus, everything is a talk that we are far from rational and efficient 312 water resources management despite the growing challenges.
313
The interests and priorities of these stakeholders could not be addressed visibly in the process 314 that they are hesitant to the outcome of IWRM. For example, a group interview (4 men and 3 women) 315
with Dire reservoirs area, major water suppliers of Addis Ababa City, agitatedly revealed the context 316 and questioned how IWRM is promoted in their areas as follow: 317 some NGOs, Federal governments, and Addis Ababa City Administration dictate us to manage 318 watershed surrounding the reservoir. We make our livelihoods from farming, grazing, quarrying, etc.
319
near to the reservoirs. We cannot stop these because these are the sources of our livelihood. We need base that disconnection could be possible when external funds are ceased before internal capacity is 330 developed. Moreover, the interventions often failed to address the underlying systemic reason that 331 justifies why IWRM is not properly implemented. The policy and subsequent proclamations and 332 regulations did not thoroughly address the socio-political system complexity of water resources 333 when both Federalism and RBOs co-exist. The policy faced the difficulty of harmonizing both-334 political and hydrological boundaries. Interviews with some higher officials revealed that IWRM 335 would be difficult under the present institutional structure. Hitherto, the fragmentation of efforts 336 exacerbated water insecurity in the basin. For example, most schemes failed to design for 337 multipurpose uses that deepening the water stress (Figure 3) . It is, thus, in this sense that pragmatic 338 IWRM from the perspective of system approach is needed to understand water resources. 
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Illustrates the issue of infrastructure design and water scarcity as the driving force to water insecurity. 
354
Generally, the study observed that setting policy statement alone could not guarantee the 355 implementation of IWRM. It can be argued that one of the mechanisms to overcome such 356 discrepancies is to approach water resources management as a system that brings wider stakeholders 357 at multiple scales on board. In other words, implementation of IWRM relies on discussions and 358 consultations of different actors, and consideration of multiple uses and sectors. guidance to the water professionals and practitioners as to how the concept can be operationalized. 362
It seems that the concept was included in the policy for the sake of attracting funds, to obtain greater 363 national and international acceptance and visibility, or entice the eye of the various donors. The 364 policy even biased to domestic water supply under the guise of MDGs. In doing so, the approach so 365 far followed overlooked the balance among multi-purpose uses, sectors, and actors that water 366 scarcity and stress have growing in the populous basin like Awash. At the national level, therefore, 367 there is a need to reconcile the federal institutions, Awash Basin Authority, and regional bureaus to 368 promote pragmatic IWRM. 369
Systems Approach to Water Resources in the Basin 370
The basin system can be categorized as natural and human systems [27] . Each is a part of larger 371 basin system functioning as independent system but interacting one another. The natural system 372 involves various biophysical elements that affect water security. It includes the groundwater, the 373 land and water resources, upstream and downstream, and water quality and quantity sub-systems. 374
The human system constitutes various socioeconomic realms such as various stakeholders, water use 375 purposes, sectors, and interests, which have their own subsystems within the human system. It is 376 fundamentally necessary that the two systems operate holistically and synergistically for functioning 377 of the whole basin system. The proper functioning of the systems, of course pragmatically, enhance 378 IWRM and hence water security. 379
The Natural System 380
Within the groundwater subsystem-aquifers, there is lacuna of rules or laws regulating and 381 governing the subsystem. Standards and governing laws for abstraction, drilling, and use of 382 groundwater in the basin are not clearly defined that the subsystem is dominated by a temptation of 383 free-riders 6 . Any user can drill water either using rig machine or hand-dug for any purpose if they 384 can afford the cost of extraction. The groundwater engaged a range of water users from deep drilling 385 for irrigated agriculture to shallow well for domestic purposes. Interviews with experts attested that 386 there are no collective actions on groundwater management (allocations, utilization). The action of 387 one actor is unknown for the other actors. Neither fees nor tariffs are set for and collected from users. 388 Some are licensed others are arbitrary. For example, several medium and small-scale agricultural 389 land operators, as well as industries-the massive water users-are not licensed and provided with 390 water use permit. This implicates the extent to which the key stakeholders completely overlooked 391 groundwater governance in the basin. It is a conspicuous manifestation of institutional failure in the 392 Awash Basin. Thus, the exploitation of groundwater subsystems are uncoordinated and become a 393 'tragedy of the common', which needs groundwater governance and proper institutional framework. 394
The study also revealed that surface water resources subsystem is poorly managed and 395 allocated, in which collective actions are not operational. Surface water subsystem in the basin 396 comprises all rivers, lakes, ponds, dams, and other storage due to runoffs and/or groundwater 397 recharges. First, it is the major source of commercial farmers to irrigate farms through pumping out 398 the running river. About 97.3% of irrigated areas are furrow/surface irrigation systems. This irrigation 399 system is inherently inefficient in terms of water use. FAO [35] estimated that the efficiency of furrow 400 irrigation in the basin is about 30-40 % compared to 80-90% of sprinkler and 90-95% of drip systems. Table 3 ). The Awash Basin Authority attempted to collect 424 some tariffs for flood protection though it is negligible with the increasing flood frequency and 425 coverage. Moreover, there is an intention that the active involvement of government is to support 426 those who could not pay for water resources development given the poor community could not pay 427 for O&M, encourage full cost recovery in the urban area, and promote cross-subsidization. The policy 428 speculated that all pricing schemes should take into account the willingness-to-pay by users as a tool 429 to encourage water resources sustainability. 430 Table 3 . Water pricing system in the Awash River Basin (X= Not accounted, =Accounted)
431

Pricing system
Irrigation Domestic use Urban
Domestic use Rural
Industrial Use
Nevertheless, we found out that most users are not paying in accordance with the value of water. 433
While the smallholder farmers (both modern and traditional irrigation), artifacts, mining, 434 brickmaking, and other productive purposes can use water free of charge, the pricing mechanisms 435 for commercial and industrial purposes are vague and inconsistent. Some large-scale private farms 436 and state sugarcane plantations freely divert or pump out water directly from the river. Industries 437 also dug their own medium and deep well still do not pay water extraction fees. Of course there are 438 not licensed. The permitting and licensing of the surface water for the various purpose were also not 439 uniform. In urban water supply sector, surface water is so poorly managed that some waters are 440 stolen, illegally connected, or wasted. One of such indication is the high Non-Revenue Water (NRW) 441 in major cities. For example, in Addis Ababa City where there is a growing water scarcity, NRW is 442 estimated at 36.5% [39] . This affects domestic water security of other residents of the city and a 443 community where the water is originally extracted. 444
As the value of water is undervalued, the existing water resources could be mismanaged and 445
abused. This gradually induces pollutions and scarcity. Water price for irrigation, domestic for urban, 446 domestic for rural, and industrial uses are rarely revised to reflect the changing cost of water 447 management and scarcity value of water. The setting of water pricing is not set arbitrary. It isprocedural. First, the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy (MoWRIE) and/or Regional Water 449
Bureau prepare the price proposal. Then, the Ministry presents it to the council of people's 450 representative -regulatory body and the respective water utilities and departments implement fee 451 collection at users' level. The water pricing policy in the basin needs to be reconsidered so that the 452 value of water would be released at policymaking level. However, pricing water for irrigation and 453 industrial water uses are not clear. 454
In addition, the effectiveness of water policy in promoting technologies, extension, and 455 wastewater recycling are non-existing. The installations of water measuring devices are insufficient. 456
The already installed once are not functional. At present, there is no technology to estimate water use 457 of the major users in the basin. Interviews with stakeholders in the basin confirmed that most water 458 users such as industries/ farms, households, and urban wastes are directly releasing solid and liquid 459 wastes, as well as effluents to the water bodies in the basin without treatment or any attempt for 460 recycling. The irrigated farms are expanding in leaps and bounds but not hand-in-hand with the 461 advancement of technology to save water, to monitor water uses, and to minimize pollution of 462 surface and groundwater systems. The rush to expand irrigated farming practices at Metahara, 463
Abadir, Tendaho, Amibera, and central highlands would lead to perils without proper collective 464 actions. The expansion of the hypersaline lake Beseka that intruding into the river (diverted to the 465 main Awash River below Methehara Sugar Estate) from the previously closed lake has also been a 466 major concern and compromising the water quality in the lower basin. The extreme hydrological 467 phenomenon such as floods and droughts, which evicted several people, are not properly managed. 468
The major reason is that pertinent institutions and actors are not collaboratively working together 469 towards an IWRM. 470
The general picture in the basin showed that water-pricing policy is haphazard and not systemic 471
[40]. The uncoordinated water pricing system has discouraged technical innovation for water 472 resources management in addition to aggravating 'tragedy of the common'. For obvious reasons, 473 when water resources are not properly managed and undervalued, water security suffers. This 474 gradually induces pollution and scarcity of both the surface water and groundwater subsystems as 475 the relationship and integration of the two subsystems received little attention. For example, 476 informants agreed that low irrigation technology coupled with inconsistent regulatory mechanisms 477 for water abstractions, pollutions have affected the integration and management of surface water 478 groundwater. Furthermore, it affected the quality of water available to people for various purposes. 479
In other words, the ground and surface water sub-systems as elements of natural system need 480 integration. The natural system also depends on how the land and water resources managements are 481 properly and coherently integrated. Land degradation is the major problem in the Awash Basin [41] 482 due to deforestation, urbanization, and intensive cultivation. As such flooding during excessive rain 483 and drought during water scarcity often hit the entire basin system. Such phenomenon is key causes 484 for water quality deterioration and diminishing water quantity. In addition, the upstream-485 downstream dilemma has hardly notice in the Awash basin system but it is a critical to comprehend 486 the state of water security. The downstream users believe that the actions of upstream water users 487 have affected negatively the the quantity and quality of water available to them. Industries are 488 releasing effluents; agriculturalists use agro-chemicals recklessly; cities dispose all sorts of wastes 489 directly to water bodies; and land and water resources management and conservations are 490 inadequate that the downstream actors are suffering from pollutions, water scarcity, and floods. 491
The Human System 492
Within the human system, complex realities are prevailing and emerging. This is because diverse 493 behaviors of the actors, various interests, and uses are central to the basin management [40] . This 494 system is also so dynamic that it poses complexity and non-linearity in interaction [6] . For example, 495 the interest of pastoralists in the basin system conflicts with irrigators who engaged in agriculture 496 and delineate their space. This mainly not only due to fierce competition over water access but also 497 as a result of land resources within the enclave of the key grazing areas, which the pastoralists utilizedevelopment' on the wrong perception that pastoralism is not feasible and not contribute to 500 agricultural development that their priority must come first. The other interaction in the basin is a 501 grave competition between the large scale and small-scale irrigators over access to both land and 502
water. Most small-scale irrigator are early settlers while large-scale famers are latecomers in the form 503 of 'investors'. Some of these large-scale farms are owned by state. Recently, some of them are 504 privatized. The Kereyyu and Afar pastoralists have started irrigated agriculture. As a result, 505 during the dry season-December and May, there is always water scarcity. Scarcity often escalates 506 conflicts to the extent of water looting and violence. Sometimes, irrigation canals damaged. That it 507 affects the livestock and drinking water access. The private sectors including the industrialists and 508 service providers are complaining of water scarcity. They stressed that public sectors responsible for 509 water construction, management, and allocation are irresponsive and unaccountable to rampant 510 water crises. 511
Research, extension, and education are essential entities to generate knowledge, disseminate, 512
and raise awareness about IWRM. Research and training institutions are carrying out researches and 513 document practices and challenges. So far, some water saving technologies such as drip and sprinkler 514 irrigations, and reservoirs remain within the vicinity of the large-scale farms and state plantations. 515
These facilities are not economically affordable and replicable to small-scale agriculturalists. We came 516 across that research and training institutions in water sectors are often relying on donors and state 517 funding to carryout research and trainings including the AwRBA. The AwRBA are principal body 518 assigned to undertake research and development regarding the basin. Given the staff and financial 519 capacity, the Authority did not implement any groundbreaking research, development or technology 520 generation. Interviews with experts and stakeholders demand water use related awareness creation, 521 training, and extension advisory services. However, there are sporadic studies by academician and 522
Regional States for specific purposes. Thus, the AwRBA did not link itself with the regional and local 523 governments, communities and stakeholders including academic institutions. 524
Despite the public sectors have recognized the problem of water resources crises in the basin, 525 there are limited investments on technological solutions to manage and conserve the resources in 526 integrated manner. For example, the management of solid and liquid waste is insignificant. The 527 campaign based watershed management is also unorganized and did not engage relevant 528 stakeholders. It was merely perceived as the onus of smallholder farmers on a plot basis. Post 529 watershed development was rarely monitored. Perhaps, the efforts so far made by donors, NGOs, 530 and CSOs to support water access for domestic, livestock, and small-scale irrigation, and other 531 productive uses should be the central part of the human system, which need to be seen pragmatically. 532 533 relationships. Still, neural links prevail due to poor collective actions, poor system integration and 543 management. These suggest failure of integration between various systems. Therefore, integration 544 requires a systemic means to bring the links among the entities as pragmatic as possible so that the 545 entities contribute to the natural and human systems and thereby the whole basin system. The 546 realization of functional basin system driven by IWRM entails enabling institutional environments in 547 addition to understanding the nature and synergy of the two major systems. 548
Search for Enabling Institutional Environment for IWRM 549
The institutional environments in the basin are always in motion with the changing political, 550 economic, and social circumstances. In many cases, water institutions have evolved over long period 551 because institutions pass through interactive processes [42] . They potentially tie together to 552 numerous agencies, actors, and sectors, who often occupied with various responsibilities. Their 553 exclusion affects water management that they are often necessary for them to coordinate plans, 554 negotiate differences, exchange technical information, and generally cooperate in the achievement of 555 concerted policy and administration [38] . Institutions are enabling environments under every 556 circumstances. Sometimes, new institutions disrupt the existing settings and cause inefficiencies in 557 water resource allocations, and distribution of costs and benefits among resource users. For example, 558
Saleth & Dinar [43] ) argued that institutional change has a mixed pack. While some induces 559 efficiency, others constrained it. Thus, institutions can be explained in terms of 'capacity to produce' 560 either collective benefits for all groups of actors and distributional advantage for powerful 561 stakeholders. There is 'no silver bullet' solution for functioning of IWRM in the basin but contextual 562 rationally is useful. Instead, the design of institutional environments that enable the human and 563 natural systems, can regulate the actions (and non-actions) of the different stakeholders [44] , are 564
needed. 565
Experts also advice that in order to make water users and vibrant stakeholders for water 566 resources a management as well as the government bodies and AwRBA as key players of the game, 567 incentives are necessary. The Water users need to be frequently consulted, oriented, trained, and 568 introduced to new water use and saving technologies as an incentive package. The AwRBA and 569 pertinent government bodies should create a harmony to plan and implement IWRM and to enforce 570 the already existing laws on water use, permit, pollution control, and conservation. Thus, as 571 mechanism of check and balance, enforcement of laws alone is not sufficient but it must be 572 accompanied by proper incentive. 573
We identified, two broad sources of institutional environments need to be considered as 574 enabling in the Awash River basin. The first are sketched to enabling political ideologies and 575 technological advancement to allocate water resources more efficiently. The second sources of 576 institutional environment emanated from external supports-multilateral and bilateral donor 577 agencies-in terms of economic and political agreements such as political liberalization, 578 decentralization, or democratization of institutions. Both changes are influenced by the neoliberal 579 thinking promoted by major donors such as the World Bank and the IMF of the early 1990s hijacked 580 IWRM and affected water resources management in the development countries [16] . Curiously 581 putting, enablers may turned to disablers when imposed from-above. In addition, uniform 582 institutional environments may not work in water resources development. This is what Ostrom[45] 583 system is always dynamic because other systems or subsystems change within it. For example, 585 under the circumstances of water insecurity, the way of thinking on water allocation and conflict 586 resolution mechanisms could shift. The water users who often considered as beneficiaries under 587 conventional perspective become 'customers' or 'clients' from system perspective as water 588 availability moves from state of plenty to the state of insecurity [46] . This also calls for concurrent 589 systematic shift in water institutions. 590
Under such change in systems, the rules and regulations of water resources development, use, 591
and distribution often redefine which we call system dynamism. The dynamism of the system 592 changes the existing supply and demand, as well as quality and quantity of water to reflect the reality 593 on the ground. In contrast to the system perspective, stakeholders in the Awash River Basin perceive 594 the government institutions as service providers whereas the service providers consider the water 595 users not as clients but beneficiaries. Moreover, the water and related institutions adhered to sectorial 596 thinking. The governing rules and regulations are obsolete that balancing demand and supply, as 597
well as water quality and quantity were impossible. Thus, water is becoming scarce during the dry 598 season and a surfeit during the rainy season. 599
The previous work of the same author identified that financial and human capacity are the major 600 constraints of Awash River Basin in addition to vertical and horizontal coordination failures [40] . 601
These pitfalls can be attributed to institutional capacity [47] , which affect the enabling environment 602 in which IWRM operates. The setting up of enabling environments should not be sudden, both 603 physically and institutionally because it further upset the existing institutions. Thus, institutional 604 environments must mitigate such instability, which potentially trigger political strains-for example, 605 between the Regional States and Basin Authority, between the local community and large-scale water 606 appropriators, as well as between the formal and customary institutions. Noteworthy, this paper is 607 not proposing that change in institutional environments is always demanding because it may not 608 necessarily yields positive outcomes. There are associated risks such as dismantling existing 609 institutions exacerbate inequalities in water access, trigger environmental problems, and conflict of 610 interests, among others. We rather argue that institutional change is desirable when it maximizes the 611 goal of water security. 612
In order to analyze the percept of the enabling institutional environments for IWRM, about five 613 criteria of water resources management and development institutions were weighed at Likert scale 614 of five drawing on the indicators developed by [43, 46] . The scores of the scale were converted to 615 percentage. The first criteria is physical institutional environment in terms of ability to bridge overall 616 demand-supply gap, physical health of water development projects; conflict-resolution efficiency 617 (low cost and less time), smoothness of water transfers across sectors and regions, and smoothness 618 of water transfers between users. The aggregate result gave 46% of possible capacity. The second is 619 financial enabler that encompasses actual investment vs. investment requirements and cost recovery 620 vs. expenditure, which scored 42%. The third is economic aspect that rates the extent to which water 621 prices cover supply cost and extent to which water prices cover scarcity value. In terms of meeting 622 economic efficiency, it is perceived to be just 40% of what it ought to be. The forth is equity issues 623 among regions, sectors, and different stakeholder groups, which remains lower than the average and 624 maximum expected values. The final is progressiveness of water institution that takes into account 625 factors such as effectiveness, flexibility, adaptability, technological applications, innovation, and 626 openness to change, which scored the lowest of all criteria and 40% of maximum value. 627
The result showed that the performance indicators of all institutional enabling environments 628 have rated below the expected average value (50%) with the overall performance is still low (42%), 629 according to the perception of the respondents. Figure 7 is suggesting that the water institutions in 630 the Awash River basin, as evaluated by the experts, are not to the expectation to ensure IWRM 631 through safeguarding water availability, accessibility, and proper utilization on sustainable basis. 632
There is need for further works to improve the enabling institutional environments to suit to IWRM. 
Conclusions and Further Implications 649
This paper draws on IWRM as systems thinking that recognizes the issue of water resources 650 management holistically as it engages multi-actors and multiple sectors with diverse interests and 651 priorities. Most previous approaches and existing formal institutions in the basin in cascading IWRM 652 followed reductionism perspective that often centered the rhetoric of IWRM. The institutional 653 arrangements will not enhance the water security at the basin levels without invigorating and 654 revitalizing the 'old concept' of IWRM pragmatically. Pragmatically working with various 655 stakeholders in a coordinated manner could avoid unnecessarily overlapping and fragmentation of 656 efforts in watershed and basin managements. It also helps to bridge the discrepancies between policy 657 and practices, as well as between rhetoric and realities that IWRM could move beyond a fashionable, 658 buzzword, and trendy concept to making institutions work for water security at basin level. 659 IWRM in Ethiopia has failed to be realized not due to lack of policy and advocacy issues per se 660 but the shortfall of the contextual practices. The failure to balance the natural and human systems 661 and subsystems along with reengineering the enabling environments is key reason for setback of 662 IWRM. Thus, operationalization of IWRM require functioning of the systems (natural, human), 663 subsystems (e.g. surface and groundwater, land and water, etc.), as well as other elements within the 664
subsystems. 665
Reasonably, IWRM needs to reconcile various aspects listed underneath: 666
• Substantial strengthening of the information and evidence on the water uses, users, allocation, 667 distributions, and water-related risks to reverse negative linkages, strengthen poor interaction, 668 and strengthen positive interfaces; 669
• Ensuring that budget and finance mobilized from donors, the public, and water users through 670 taking into account water as economic goods as much as public goods; 671
• Creation of awareness among stakeholders; encouraging the engagement of private sectors in 672 water resources development and management; inculcate the culture of corporate social 673 responsibility; establishing functional platform to cheer interactions and intricacies among the 674 stakeholders; and 675
• IWRM need to be advocated pragmatically via enabling institutional environments in the basin 676 context, and mainstream it to water and related sectors, actors, and users. 677
